



Asia-Pacific Counter-IED Fusion Center

Monthly IED Activity Report



DOI: 31 August 2018

About the APCFC

The Asia-Pacific C-IED Fusion Center is the premier center for irregular warfare analysis in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. The center develops and synchronizes C-IED and EOD programs and regional engagements. The center resources USARAPC C-IED training to ensure U.S., Allied, and Partner Nations survivability.



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Contents

Past Year Activity

Executive Summary pg. 1-2
By Region pg. 2
Annual Overview pg. 3

August Activity

Switch Types pg. 4
Group Affiliation pg. 4
Incident Highlight pg. 4
Special Assessment pg. 5-6
Person of Interest pg. 7
VEO of Interest pg. 7

South Asia

Significant Activity pg. 8
Bangladesh pg. 9
India pg. 10
Nepal pg. 11

Southeast Asia


Significant Activity pg. 12
Philippines pg. 13
Thailand pg. 14

Northeast Asia

Significant Activity pg. 15
Japan pg. 16
Calendar pg. 17
Glossary pg. 18


Executive Summary: In August, there were 92 IED events within the Asia-Pacific region, consisting of 33 detonation events, 20 found/cleared events, 11 hoax events, and 28 cache events. While IED rates remained relatively stable compared to last month, IED-related casualty rates increased by over 30%. August events included a total of 397 devices, compared to 396 in July.

There were 92 IED events in the Indo-Pacific region in August 2018




Icons depict events for August 2018; heat map depicts event density from August 2017 - August 2018

August IED events




■ Detonation ■ Hoax
■ Found/Cleared ■ Cache

August IED events by Country



August IED Casualties




■ CIV KIA ■ HN KIA
■ CIV WIA ■ HN WIA

[Click on an entry to advance to the associated page.](#)

This document is limited to those personnel performing military, intelligence, law enforcement, or security duties in support of C-IED operations.

August Asia-Pacific IED Events by Region



Executive Summary (Continued)

SOUTH ASIA

IED activity increased from 59 events in July to 72 in August. IED-related casualty rates also increased, from 27 casualties in July to 37 in August. In Bangladesh, there were 5 IED events (a 28% decrease from July) and no IED-related casualties (compared to 6 in July) ([see pg. 9](#)). In India, there were 43 IED events (a 12% decrease from July) and 37 IED-related casualties (compared to 21 in July) ([see pg. 10](#)). In Nepal, there were 24 IED events (compared to 2 in July) and no IED-related casualties (the same as July) ([see pg. 11](#)).

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	37	28	17	293	375
	Year	943	325	32	1783	3083
Event Count	Month	25	16	9	22	72
	Year	190	74	10	142	416

SOUTHEAST ASIA




IED activity decreased from 33 events in July to 18 in August. Despite this decrease, IED-related casualty rates increased from 35 casualties in July to 51 in August (all of which stemmed from IED events in the Philippines). In the Philippines, there were 17 IED events (a 19% decrease from July) and 51 IED-related casualties (a 65% increase from July) ([see pg. 13](#)). In Thailand, there was 1 IED event (compared to 4 in July) and no IED-related casualties (compared to 3 in July) ([see pg. 14](#)).

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	7	6	2	5	20
	Year	264	538	15	659	1476
Event Count	Month	7	4	2	5	18
	Year	438	225	22	64	749

NORTHEAST ASIA

There were two IED events in Northeast Asia this month, an IED detonation in Sendagaya, Tokyo and an IED cache recovery in Nagoya City ([see pg. 16](#)).

PACOM IED Events - Past 12 Months




		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	45	34	19	299	397
	Year	1210	863	47	2443	4563
Event Count	Month	33	20	11	28	92
	Year	627	300	30	377	1334


IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OPEN SOURCES are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations. Event refers to specific IED activity categories: IED Detonation, IED Found/Cleared, IED Hoax, IED Cache.

IED Activity - Past 12 Months

Switch Type



Group Affiliation



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics are presumed to be approximations. Graphics represent known switch type and group affiliation.


Incident Highlight: Japan Improvised Can Explosion on Train Platform

On 26 AUG, an unlabeled 500-milliliter aluminum can containing an unidentified alkaline liquid and white powder exploded on a passenger platform at the Shinjuku Station in Tokyo, causing superficial burns on a passerby. Tokyo Metropolitan Police indicated there were signs of an explosion of an alkaline liquid, which would generate hydrogen when in contact with aluminum (such as in a sealed can). Witnesses said they heard a loud bang, and images from the blast area show the can, its cap blown off, and a white powdery residue on the platform.

The can was located near a staircase that accessed the train platform and exploded early in the morning on a weekend (Sunday at 0540 AM); notably, not at rush hour. The placement of the can and its timing for dispersal do not indicate an intent to cause mass casualties; however, it is possible that the can exploded prematurely. Although it is possible that this was an industrial liquid left accidentally on the platform, no agency or individual has yet to claim responsibility and the lack of labeling on the can makes this an unlikely commercial or industrial container. Police conducted tests and determined that the substances contained in the can were not radioactive or flammable gases.

This is a significant event in Japan even though there were no damages to infrastructure and only one slightly wounded victim. The placement and preparation of the can to explode with a caustic or flammatory liquid shows both an intent and capability to carry out an attack. This type of event can indicate a testing phase for a group, an amateurish attempt to gain attention, or even a targeted attack on a person. The Tokyo Metropolitan Police stated they were investigating the incident as a possible assault, taking the latter assumption that it may have been targeting a specific individual. Regardless of the intent, the place chosen for the can to explode recalls the 1995 sarin gas attacks and related attacks with hydrogen cyanide in Japan (see July 2018 APCFC C-IED Monthly IED Activity Report, Japan highlight). An additional motive worthy of consideration is that the Japanese government recently executed the 13 convicted leaders of the Japanese-based Aum Shinrikyo extremist cult who had carried out the 1995 sarin gas attacks. These executions could have prompted retribution by any remaining cult members.

The Shinjuku Station is the busiest train station in the world, handling three quarters of a million commuters daily. If one wanted to incite fear in the Japanese populace, placing an explosive device that releases a caustic or deadly material at this station would prove to be an effective TTP.



Close-up of aluminum can and white residue on (screen capture from [YouTube](#) video embedded in News on Japan article).

Sources: Reuters (7/30/18) Long War Journal (7/31/18) Inquirer (7/31/18) Mindanao Examiner (7/31/18)

Special Assessment: RCIED Threat Landscape in the Indo-Pacific

The IED switch is perhaps one of the most important yet nuanced aspects of tracking the IED threat and reducing its impact. Understanding subtle and significant modifications in switch types enables counter-IED and EOD personnel to more effectively counter and/or render safe IEDs, as well as provides the greater counter-IED community of interest a detailed understanding of the threat to develop mitigation techniques and equipment. One of the most pervasive and advanced IED switch types is the Radio-Controlled (RC) switch. Violent extremist organizations have employed RCIEDs for years, with the first noted usage by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the 1970s. The use of RCIEDs became more prevalent in the 2000s, due to the increased ease of access to electronic components and the development of deadlier IED TTPs, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Extremist organizations prefer the use of RC switches (as compared to timed, command wire, and victim-operated switches) as such devices facilitate the establishment of a safe distance between the militant and the intended targets. In the Indo-Pacific theater, there are no consistent or overarching patterns associated to the use of RCIEDs; this region's RCIED threat is largely characterized by disparate capabilities and TTPs associated to a specific area, country, or VEO. The following summarizes the current RCIED threat landscape in the Indo-Pacific.

Southeast Asia

Philippines: The RCIED threat in the Philippines is simplistic yet effective. In the mid-2000's, the infamous Jemaah Islamiyah bomb-maker, Zukifili Abdhir (alias Marwan), introduced a series of standardized IED construction TTPs that proved to be easily understood and incorporated into the IED designs of bomb-makers throughout the Southern Philippines. Marwan's likely contribution to the RCIED consisted of a relatively straightforward Silicon-Controlled Rectifier (SCR) control board. A SCR enables the audio speaker of a device to initiate a detonator. Bomb-makers typically wire the SCR to the speaker output of a cellular telephone and sometimes connect the SCR to a Personal Mobile Radio (PMR). This assembly method is not without risk, as it can inadvertently initiate a pre-detonation. However, this RCIED TTP is easy to implement and versatile, as the bomb-maker can design a device to initiate via multiple, remote means to include the use of alarm timers on a cellular telephone and/or radio transmissions. The intention is to prompt the cellular telephone or radio to emit sound from the speaker output, which in turn, engages the SCR, which then initiates a detonator.



Moro Islamic/southern Philippines-style SCR. Blown in place at the US Embassy in Manila (November 2016)

While militants have employed other RCIED switches types (e.g. remote car alarm switches), the SCR-enabled RCIED remains the most common RCIED TTP throughout the Philippines, particularly among Moro Islamic or ISIS-Philippines bomb-makers in the southern Philippines. A prime example of the operational employment of this TTP was the discovery of an IED near the U.S. Embassy Manila in November 2016. The device's characteristics and construction suggests the involvement of southern Philippines insurgents in the attempted attack. It appears that the use of an SCR together with a radio transmitter is a construction technique isolated to the Philippines, as observations of similar devices appearing in other portions of the Indo-Pacific region are lacking.

Thailand: The Southern Thai Insurgency (STI) employs perhaps the most advanced RCIED TTPs in the Indo-Pacific. Most notably, the STI possesses a knowledge and proficiency with the use of Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency (DTMF) receivers. When used in IEDs, DTMF receivers provide militants an encoding capability (i.e. the detonation of a device requires the input of a specific sequence of pre-programmed tones). Additionally, militants use DTMF receivers in conjunction with cellular telephones and PMRs to avoid unintended IED detonations; the DTMF receiver allows the user to connect remotely to a transceiver (i.e. cellular telephone or PMR) and issue commands such as, arming the device, placing the device in "safe" mode, and detonating the bomb. Perhaps the most important advantage associated to the use of DTMF receivers is that such



DTMF example from Iraq (left); DTMF-enabled RCIED in Southern Thailand (right), using PMR as a transceiver

Special Assessment: RCIED Threat Landscape in the Indo-Pacific

devices, used in combination with simple and low-cost walkie-talkies, provides a triggering mechanism that gives the attacker standoff, particularly in rural environments that have limited or no cellular infrastructure. Though DTMF was pervasive in conflict areas outside the Indo-Pacific (e.g. Iraq and Afghanistan), Southern Thailand remains the only known Indo-Pacific area that utilizes DTMF-enabled RCIEDs.

Burma: Knowledge of the RCIED threat in Burma remains relatively limited, but the use of radio-controlled devices is an emerging TTP used by both the Buddhist-Nationalist (i.e. the Arakan National Council) and ethno-political insurgents in the north. In recent years, militants have employed car alarm-style remotes in Kachin and Rakhine States. All indications suggest that the development and implementation of RCIED TTPs in Burma is not associated to the importation of knowledge and expertise from external militant organizations, but rather, due to the indigenous development of RCIED practices.

South Asia:

India: The RCIED threat in India has evolved independently in three separate regions of the country. In Jammu and Kashmir, militants adopted the practice of employing RCIEDs from the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, likely beginning in the early-to-mid 2000's. Militants in this region have typically employed devices using DTMF receivers. Recently though, the use RCIED technology in Jammu and Kashmir has waned and corresponds to the current overall decline of IED activity observed in the area.

Reporting on the present usage of RC technology by the Maoist/Naxalite insurgents in the Red Corridor remains sparse; however, there are limited reports of insurgents using custom ultra-high frequency and very-high frequency RCIED switches.

In recent years, reporting indicates that the use of radio frequency switches (devices that route signals along different transmission channels) by insurgents has been on the rise in northeast India's Seven Sister's Corridor.



Radio Frequency Transmitter (RFT)-style RCIED switch recovered in North-east India

An RCIED employing radio frequency switches normally pairs with a low-cost remote control that sends a wireless signal via simple push-button operation. Bomb-makers associated with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in Manipur, India are likely the primary users of such systems for the assembly of RCIEDs. Though insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan used this construction technique often, comparisons with devices discovered in India suggests the local development of this practice by Indian militants, rather than the migration of this practice from external conflict zones.

Nepal: Reports of RCIEDs in Nepal were a rare occurrence until the country's recent spike in IED activity associated to election violence. Likely the first RCIED event reported in Nepal occurred in November 2016, when Nepalese security forces reportedly defused an RCIED in Saptari District. The exact switch type remains unknown; however, Nepal Army EOD reported the device as a pressure cooker RCIED. It is still unknown if external or internal influences are responsible for the recent radio-controlled switch development in Nepal.

Conclusion: The demonstrated proficiency by VEOs in the fabrication and use of RC technology is clearly on the rise in the Indo-Pacific, particularly as militant employment of RCIEDs has become more pervasive in recent years. Such an advancement of IED practices is not surprising, as the Indo-Pacific VEO threat landscape continues to evolve. Unfortunately, the combination of legally and easily procured electronic components and the proliferation of knowledge and how-to guides creates significant challenges associated to the countering of these devices. As such, militants will likely continue to seek new and innovative radio-controlled means to detonate IEDs.

Sources: Wired Magazine (12/11/08) Small Wars Journal (2009) UNOG IBTimes (12/1/16) Phoenix New Times (6/14/18) ADF C-IED TF/UNOG (2012) DVB (10/19/17) NSG Bombshell (7/24/14) C-IED COE (2017) Himalayan Times (11/27/16)

Person of Interest / VEO of Interest

POI: Jahidul Islam Mizan

ALIAS: Boma Mizan, Kausar, Munna, Bomaru Mizan, Jahidur Rahman, Mohammad Zahidul Islam, Imrul Kayes, Zahidul Hasan Suman **AGE:** 38 **AFFILIATION:** Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) **AREA OF OPERATIONS:** India and Bangladesh **STATUS:** Detained



Boma Mizan is one of the leaders of the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) branch in India. He is a known explosives expert and has long been a primary suspect in the 17 AUG 2005 country-wide serial bombings. He joined the JMB in 2001 and was close with the executed militant leaders Shaikh Abdur Rahman and Siddiqui Islam. Mizan's possible mentor may have been former JMB chief Moulana Saidur Rahman, with whom Mizan told the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) he met on several occasions prior to 2009.

On 14 MAY 2009, the RAB detained Mizan and brought him to his house for an inspection. Mizan's wife, acting on his instructions, detonated an IED causing injuries to herself and their two children. During later interrogations, Mizan told authorities that he wanted to attack one of the holiest Buddhist sites in India, the Bodh Gaya Temple, in response to the atrocities committed by the Burmese Army on the Rohingya people. Mizan escaped police custody on 26 FEB 2014, when militants hijacked a convoy during a prisoner transport operation. After his escape, on 2 OCT 2014 Mizan detonated an IED in Burdwan, West Bengal that killed two people.

On 6 AUG, India's National Intelligence Agency (NIA) detained Mizan from his hideout in Bengaluru, Karnataka. During a subsequent search, the NIA recovered multiple IEDs and plans to build improvised Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG). Mizan later stated that he was developing the weapon system to neutralize targets at a distance. When questioned, Mizan reportedly told authorities that the improvised RPGs might have a range of 200 to 500 meters.

Mizan's arrest will likely have a medium to high impact on the India JMB branch's ability to conduct bombing attacks; however, it is unknown how many militants Mizan trained in explosives. Authorities are also concerned that some Jihadi elements are capable of, or may soon be capable of developing and employing improvised RPGs.

Sources: India Today (8/11/18) The Daily Star (8/11/18) Daily Sun (8/08/18) The Daily Star (5/15/09) Bangla news 24 (8/07/18) The Financial Express (8/10/18) Hindustan Times (2/10/18) The Times of India (8/07/18) International Crisis Group (3/01/10) Political Island and Governance in Bangladesh, Routledge (2011)

VEO: Indian Mujahideen (IM)

LEADER: Abdul Subhan Qureshi **AFFILIATIONS:** Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT), al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent



Several radical members of SIMI in Bhatkal, Karnataka, formed IM in 2003. The founding members cited the 1992 destruction of the Babri Masjid (a mosque in Ayodhya), on-going conflicts and animosity between Hindu nationalists and Muslims, and perceived injustices at the hands of the Indian government as justifications for the emergence of IM's extremist activities. The group's primary objectives are to wage jihad against non-Muslims and the Indian government and to establish an Islamic caliphate. In 2010, the government of India declared the IM a terrorist organization; New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States followed with similar declarations. Between 2003 and 2010, members of IM conducted attacks and undertook tactical training, and some members likely gained combat experience abroad.

The common objectives and goals possessed by IM to those of both LeT and Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami's (HuJI), prompted Pakistan's ISI to encourage a tacit alliance among these groups, which would foster a mutual partnership between each organization that would allow the IM to gain international assistance and safe havens. However, IM did not fully embrace ISI's proposed support because implicit in the acceptance of working with the ISI, is the requirement to obtain permission for targeting and to conduct attacks.

In an attempt to gain support from other like-minded organizations not related to ISI, IM sought an alliance with AQIS. In 2014, IM conducted an attack against the Bodh Gaya temple and claimed the incident under the name of AQIS as part of IM's efforts to associate itself with a more notable organization. Prior to full integration with AQIS, IM attempted an attack on Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which sparked a suppression of the group's activities by the Indian government. The security forces' responses led to the arrest or neutralization of most of the organization's senior leadership, which effectively destroyed IM's operational capability.

Evidence of an attempt to re-establish IM was uncovered following the arrest and interrogation of Abdul Subhan Qureshi (see July POI) in January 2018. Though IM remains defunct, radical elements could use both the successes and failures of IM and other groups to improve their operations, recruiting, and other capabilities.

Sources: First Post (8/29/13) Hindustan Times (6/2/14) One India (8/20/14) Indian Express (1/24/18)

South Asia: August Significant Activity

Bangladesh

Throughout the month of August, Bangladeshi and Indian security forces worked to dismantle Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) cells on both sides of the border. These actions led to the arrest of dozens of suspected JMB militants, and the recovery of both IED materials and small arms. In particular, the arrest of infamous bomb-maker and leader Boma Mizan (**see POI**) by the Indian National Investigation Agency represents the forward momentum of counter terrorism operations in both countries. In a press release regarding Mizan's capture, the Deputy Commissioner of Dhaka Metropolitan Police's Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) unit highlighted the value of cross-border information sharing to address joint problems. **Indian Express (8/5/18) Daily Star (8/8/18)**

In mid-August, CTTC officials released details about JMB's fundraising activities in Bangladesh. Investigations revealed that the group uses robbery and coercion of prison inmates to raise funds. Some of the inmates were promised forgiveness for their sins against Islam and others were told their families would be protected if they donated money to the organization. JMB uses a portion of the inmates' funds to hire legal counsel in an attempt to secure their release from prison. Police received information that JMB has collected over 100,000 USD since 2015 through criminal activity. **Daily Star (8/17/18)**

India

On Aug 5, the Central Reserve Police Forces (CRPF) announced that they would be taking on the additional mission of completing the remaining 4.5km of roller compacted concrete (RCC) roads between Bhairamgarh and Keshkutar in south Bijapur. The CRPF reported that no private companies wanted to come forward to build the road due to Naxalite/Maoist violence against contractors and security forces. **Daily News and Analysis (8/5/18)**

On 6 AUG, Indian officials announced their plans to develop a new tracking system for commercial grade explosives, called the System for Explosives Tracking and Training (SETT) Project. The project is being developed by the Petroleum and Explosives Safety Organization (PESO) to establish effective monitoring of every explosive from the manufacturer to the end-user. To facilitate effective tracking, the project will ensure that every gelatine stick, detonator, and detonation cord, would receive a unique barcode. Additionally, the packaging will also receive unique barcodes that will be generated by the explosive manufacturers using software the SETT Project intends to develop. Each barcode will encode the country code, state code, company's explosive license number, and the factory number and the series code, which would help the investigators trace back where the explosives were produced or sold. Ultimately, India hopes that these initiatives will enable their security establishment to counter the widespread use of commercial explosives in illegal mining operations and by India's Maoist/Naxalites. **Economic Times (8/13/18)**


On Aug 11, police arrested Mizan, a Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) bomb maker at his hideout in Bengaluru. In conjunction with the arrest, police also seized sketches of RPGs, diagrams, and notes on the chemical composition of explosives. During interrogation, Mizan revealed his motive to use RPG's against VIP's and shared that his manufacturing plans have been sent to several jihadi elements throughout India. Officials suspect that elements in Kerala and Bengal are attempting to follow Mizan's instructions. **India Today (8/11/18)**

On 12 AUG, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) arrested two suspected Islamic State (IS) operatives in Hyderabad who were plotting to conduct attacks in the city. One of the detained individuals, Abdullah Basith (24) is the nephew of the former president of Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), Syed Salahuddin, a group which is known for having extremist views. **India Times (8/13/18)**

Maldives

On 5 AUG, Maldives' top court officials ruled that a suspected Islamic militant, Mohamed Abdul Rahman, could not be charged under the 2015 Anti-Terrorism Act, despite allegations that he fought in Waziristan, Pakistan for 10 years. According to prosecutors, Rahman married the sister-in-law of al-Qa'ida militant, Abu Usman, while in Pakistan. Prosecutors could not, however, prove that Rahman had actually fought in Pakistan after the 2015 law was enacted, leading the court to dismiss the case. The 2015 Act specifically forbids participation in foreign wars, and if convicted, militants could face up to 20 years in prison. Several other individuals have been brought before the court for similar reasons over the last few years, but there have yet to be any convictions. **Maldives Independent (8/5/18)**

Bangladesh: August IED Events



There were five IED cache events.

On 3 AUG, police recovered an IED cache following a raid on a suspected Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) hideout in Diarar Char, Kurigram, Rangpur. Police detained three suspected militants. The cache contained 500g of explosive powder, 0.5kg sulfuric acid, grenade materials, one pistol, two magazines, and four bullets. **Daily Star (8/5/18)**


On 12 AUG, Dhaka Metropolitan Police recovered an IED cache following the arrest of four suspected JMB members in Abdullapur, Uttara, Dhaka. The cache contained 96 detonators, 10 batteries, bomb making materials, and two machetes. **BD News 24 (8/13/18) Dhaka Tribune (8/14/18)**

Between 27-31 AUG, Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) forces raided three JMB hideouts and recovered IED caches. The raids led to the arrest of 10 JMB militants, which included regional leaders. The RAB recovered 600g of gunpowder, 15 electrical circuits, bomb making materials, three pistols, ammunition and magazines, jihadi literature, cell phones, and other items. **Daily Star (8/29/18) Dhaka Tribune (8/28/18) Daily Star (9/1/18) Independent BD (8/31/18)**


IED activity levels remained consistent in August, though all the events were cache recoveries. The JMB was the group likely responsible for all of August's events, and represents the larger campaign by Bangladeshi security forces to proactively neutralize the JMB threat. It seems clear from the items discovered in all of August's caches that JMB militants are still planning to build and use IEDs (most likely crude bombs or possibly basic radio-controlled devices). Security forces' pressure on ISIS-inspired Neo-JMB has effectively limited attacks and IED activity over the last two years; however, it is possible that other groups, to include JMB and Ansar al-Islam, will reassert themselves through IED or other violent extremist activity. There is already some evidence of this occurring over the last few months, to include increased JMB activity across the border in India and the murder of a prominent secular writer and publisher outside a drugstore in June.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	0	0	0	0	0
	Year	59	14	1	190	264
Event Count	Month	0	0	0	5	5
	Year	29	7	1	45	82


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

India: August IED Events



There were 20 IED detonation events, six IED found and cleared events, one IED hoax event, and 16 IED cache events.

On 8 AUG, members of the Assam Rifles found and cleared an IED during a search operation in Utlong, Manipur. Security forces discovered the IED emplaced along the roadside, wrapped in a black plastic bag. The device consisted of seven gelatin sticks, three small battery cells, nails, wire, and a detonator. **E-PAO (8/8/18) India Blooms (8/8/18)**

On 9 AUG, the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad recovered an IED cache following the arrest of three individuals in Nalasopara and Pune, Maharashtra. The suspects are right wing extremists associated to the Sanatan Sanstha organization. The cache contained 20 crude bombs, two gel sticks, four electronic detonators, 22 non-electric detonators, 150g of white powder, various circuitry and electronic components, chemicals, and IED materials. **Mid-Day (8/11/18)**

On 20 AUG, Jharkhand Police recovered a large cache of explosives in Saharpu village, Parasanath Hills, Jharkhand. The cache contained 10,000 detonators, 10,000 gelatin sticks in cartons, and 300kg of ammonium nitrate. **Hindustan Times (8/21/18) News 18 (8/20/18)**


IED activity in August was lower than July, primarily due to reductions in political violence and Maoist activity.

The primary area of activity was in the Seven Sisters region of northeast India. While it is still too early to call this increased activity a trend, increases over the long-term could be concerning because they may affect India's "Act East Policy." The policy seeks to increase cross-border development of economy and infrastructure with other Asian countries, which includes the creation of a highway running from northeast India to Thailand through Burma. There are several VEOs operating along the India-Burma border that could leverage pre-existing IED and combat experience to attack this and other infrastructure projects (the 8 AUG roadside IED in Manipur highlights the potential of this threat). Additionally, the on-going conflict on the Burma side of the border between Tatamdaw and VEO groups (such as the NSCN-K) could also impact India's development plans.


Security forces commonly recover large caches containing explosives, such as the 20 AUG event, in both the Red Corridor and the Seven Sisters region. While it is probable that the perpetrators intend to use these explosives for licit and illicit mining within India, VEOs could also acquire these items. An additional possibility is the potential smuggling of explosives and IED materials across the border into Bangladesh through West Bengal. Security forces have discovered numerous cross-border smuggling routes between India, Bangladesh, and Burma, primarily used by drug dealers, which VEOs could use to smuggle explosives or other weapons.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	31	16	1	292	340
	Year	705	188	8	1574	2475
Event Count	Month	20	6	1	16	43
	Year	262	107	8	3	380


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Nepal: August IED Events



There was five IED detonation events, 10 IED found and cleared events, eight hoax IED events, and one IED cache event.


On 12 AUG, a possible RCIED detonated outside the mayor's office at the city building in Biratnagar, Morang, Koshi. The Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (Revolutionary) (JTMM-R) claimed responsibility for the attack. Police arrested three suspects from the group seen on CCTV emplacing the device. **Kathmandu Post (8/12/18) Himalayan Times (8/13/18) Kathmandu post (8/13/18) Kathmandu Post (9/2/18)**

On 14 AUG, Nepal Army EOD cleared a pressure cooker IED along a roadside near an industrial site in Madhyapur Thimi-1, Lokanthali, Bagmati. Authorities suspect CPN-M was responsible for the IED. **Nepal Monitor (8/14/18) Ratopati (8/14/18)**

IED activity spiked in August, due in large part to the CPN-M's use of IEDs in their blockade and protest of the arrest of their spokesperson, Khagda Bahadur Bishwokarma (alias Prakanda). Following the end of the blockade on 14 AUG, there were no further reported IED incidents.

The most significant event in August was the 12 AUG attack on the mayor's office in Biratnagar by the JTMM, led by Jaya Krishna Goit. The attackers allegedly purchased the device, described as remote control detonated, in India and then brought it over the border to Biratnagar. This is the first attack claimed by JTMM in several months. In a statement to the media, Goit mentioned that he wanted to prove that they were capable of conducting attacks outside of their normal operating areas of Saptari and Siraha. A resurgence of IED activity by the JTMM-R would likely seek to destabilize local government and/or infrastructure as part of an effort to undermine the faith of the populace in government services.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	6	12	16	1	35
	Year	179	123	23	17	342
Event Count	Month	5	10	8	1	24
	Year	147	111	13	12	283



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Southeast Asia: August Significant Activity

Philippines

On 6 AUG, President Duterte signed into law a bill that establishes a national identity card in the Philippines. All Philippine residents (citizens and aliens) will be required to register for a card, with the goal to complete the enrollment of all 106 million residents by 2022. Proponents of the law claim that the new identity system will improve the delivery of government services by establishing a single identity card that will be accepted by all government agencies and departments. The cards, which will be provided for free, will capture the usual demographic data (name, sex, date of birth, address), but it also captures biometric data (full front facing photo, full set of fingerprints, and an iris scan). Additionally, each registered person will be given a PhilSys Number (PSN) - a randomly generated, unique, and permanent identification number. **Bloomberg (8/28/18) Rappler (8/8/2018)**

Burma

On 8 AUG, a court in Rakhine State sentenced two men who were arrested for the involvement of the 24 FEB Sittwe bombings, to six months for crossing the border illegally. Suspects Ko Than Shwe and Ko Maung Myint Kyi have stated that they have been wrongfully charged since the police were unable to find evidence tying them to the Sittwe bombings. **The Irrawaddy (8/10/18)**

In a media report released on 18 AUG, the Naga separatist group, National Socialist Committee of Nagaland – Konyak (NSCN(K)) has removed their existing chairman, Khango Konyak with a new leader, Yung Aung. The change in leadership, described as a “bloodless coup” came shortly after the recent attacks by the Burmese Army (Tatmadaw) in a NSCN(K) camp near Sagaing, Burma. Yung Aung is a Burmese Naga and nephew of Khaplang. He is a political science degree graduate from Imphal University and is an expert in explosive management and procurement. He was trained in Bangladesh, Pakistan and China by ULFA, ISI and Chinese intelligence. The Tatmadaw has been suspected of increasing its number of attacks against the insurgent group which has violated a decades-old ceasefire agreement according to the Narendra Modi government. Is it not yet clear what affect this change of leadership will have on NSCN(K) operations within Burma, however with increasing security pressure to reduce NSCN-K influence, it is likely that IED activity will increase as a result. **The Week (8/18/18)**

On AUG 28 and 29, clashes broke out between Battalion 44 of the Tatmadaw and the Karen National Union/ Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) troops after Tatmadaw troops crossed KNLA Brigade 5 territory in Kan Nyi Naung, Papun, Karen State. There have been no reports of casualties. Despite the Nationwide Cease-fire Agreement, the KNU still engages in small arms fire with Army troops. **The Irrawaddy (8/30/18)**

Thailand

In early AUG, Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha announced that in September he will state whether he will participate in the general election in May 2019. The new date is the most recent deadline for an election after several pushbacks. In 2014, Prayuth led a coup that ousted Thailand’s civilian government that has last more than four years of military rule. **Reuters (8/12/18)**


On 21 AUG, in Kampung Nasa, Pattani, officials conducted an operation to investigate the presence of armed militants in the area after receiving a tip. During the investigation suspected insurgents engaged security forces in small arms fire which resulted in two detained and one suspected militant killed. **The Sun Daily (8/22/18)**

India is revisiting plans for a trilateral highway that will stretch 845 miles and connect northeastern India with Thailand and Burma known as the “Act East” policy. The plan was originally drafted in 2001 and was known as the India-Myanmar Friendship Road, however, the construction progress has taken on new urgency as China also has its own “One Belt, One Road” project, costing half a trillion dollars. **Bloomberg (8/8/18)**

Malaysia

On 10 AUG, two technicians from a radiography firm reported that their radiography equipment was stolen from their company’s vehicle. The stolen equipment, a “Sentinel 880 Delta Source Projector”, is a portable, non-nuclear industrial radiography tool that contains the radioactive isotope Iridium-192 and emits beta and gamma radiation. Although police do not believe there is any terrorist connection with this event, authorities are concerned that the missing equipment could be converted into a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or more commonly known as a dirty bomb. As of late AUG, the equipment remains missing. **Al Jazeera (8/20/18) The Star (8/24/18)**

Philippines: August IED Events



This month, retaliation attacks from the BIFF continued with another large attack against security forces and civilians at a night market in Isulan resulted in three killed and close to 40 injured (see above). This event along with last month's VBIED attack indicate there is still a continuing terrorism threat in the region. In the aftermath of these recent events, there are rumors that martial law will be extended beyond the end of this year.

There were seven IED detonation events, three IED found and cleared events, two hoax IED events, and five IED cache events.

On 1 AUG, an IED detonated at the Masbate Port in Masbate, Bicol, Masbate after two unidentified men were seen leaving a small box near the stairs, wounding one. Recovered from the scene were PVC pipes, a paper box and SIM card. The PVC pipe recovered is similar to ones police recovered from an New People's Army (NPA) rebel camp a few days prior. **Inquirer (8/2/18) The Philippine Star (8/3/18)**


On 18 AUG, an IED was found and cleared from the baggage counter at the Unitop General Merchandise store in Koronadal, South Cotabato. Authorities were called in after bystanders discovered the device after it malfunctioned (low order detonation) from within a bag. EOD personnel found the device located inside the bag and performed a controlled detonation. The device was comprised of black powder, a 4-liter plastic water bottle containing nails in various sizes, a 9-volt battery, and a Samsung cellular phone that served as the switch. **Philippines News Agency (8/19/18)**

On 28 AUG, a hoax IED was recovered from a toilet at Lambunao National High School in Iloilo, Panay. The device, placed inside a paper bag was a cardboard tube filled with sand and wrapped in wires and electrical tape; there was also a circuit board and cellular phone battery. **Panay News (8/29/18)**


On 28 AUG, an IED detonated near a night market in Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, resulting in three civilians killed and 37 injured. The suspect left the device which was concealed inside a bag under a parked motorcycle. The device was made from a water pump which shattered and blew steel fragments and motorcycle parts. The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) claimed responsibility for the attack. **Rappler (8/30/18) UNTV (8/31/18) Mindanao Examiner (8/29/18)**

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	9	13	0	5	27
	Year	84	470	2	243	799
Event Count	Month	7	3	2	5	17
	Year	77	41	2	101	221


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Thailand: August IED Events






There was one IED found and cleared event.

On 11 AUG, an IED was discovered in Thung Yang Daeng, Pattani. EOD destroyed the device. **Bangkok Post (8/11/18)**
Benar News (8/15/18)

This month, IED activity decreased, involving only one found and cleared event, the only single event this past year. Lack of IED activity is likely attributed to ongoing periods of heavy rainfall throughout the country. Flooding from monsoons and tropical cyclones are common in Thailand from May through October. Majority of the violence in August involved a series of murder, ambushes, small arms fire and grenade attacks much like the attack on 30 AUG where a defense volunteer and civilian were killed and another wounded by a gunman at the Ban Krue Sae community market in Pattani.

Looking ahead, India, Burma and Thailand agreed to a trilateral highway known as the “Act East” policy to develop and build roads to increase trade (**See SEA SIGACTs**). Although this economic route opens more opportunities for business development, it also could attract illegal trading activities. It is possible that illegal activity such as human trafficking and cross border smuggling of weapons, drugs and explosive materials will increase along the trade route. This could lead to the increase of supply caches in Thailand. These caches could contain explosive materials or commercial grade explosives (CGE) such as Powergel which a common IED TTP used by the insurgent group known as the Maoists in India.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	0	1	0	0	1
	Year	77	24	1	57	159
Event Count	Month	0	1	0	0	1
	Year	68	17	1	11	97



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Northeast Asia: August Significant Activity

China


In August, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination issued a report on China's detention of ethnic Uighurs. China has stoutly refused the UN panel's findings of forced internment and religious discrimination. The U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China also recently called the Uighur detentions "the largest mass incarceration of a minority population in the world today." The government is holding an estimated 1 million Uighurs under harsh conditions in internment camps, where they force the detainees to criticize Islam, recite Communist propaganda, eat pork, and drink alcohol against their religious beliefs. Chinese officials refuted the panel findings, instead promoting a narrative that the internment camps are educational institutions, or even more troubling, hospitals. By casting Islamic extremism as a pathology, China euphemistically refers to the reeducation camps as "hospitals," filled with "patients" who (according to Chinese officials) suffer from a virus that causes them to behave violently and to embrace Islamic extremist ideology. By casting religious fervor as a mental illness that can be treated clinically, the Chinese claim to be helping the Uighurs, and by incarcerating so many, they are inoculating others against the "illness" in a preventative way. While it is true that Uighur separatists and violent extremists in China have caused problems in the past, China is trying to address the problem by arresting large parts of the Uighur population based solely on their religious beliefs. The irony of randomly arresting and treating Uighurs for supposed psychological problems is that China is actually causing the damage it claims to be preventing and healing. **The Atlantic (8/28/18) The Guardian (8/30/18)**

On 11 August, authorities in Ningxia region agreed to delay the demolition of a newly completed regional grand mosque in Weizhou after massive protests ensued. The mosque is the centerpiece of the 90 percent Hui Muslim majority town and is the largest in the Ningxia region. The Hui is a population of approximately 10 million, mostly living in Northwest China. Chinese authorities declared the building, built in an Arabesque style with white domes, archways, and minarets to be illegal after stating the builders did not receive the proper building permits. Thousands of Hui people gathered and remained in front of the mosque and the surrounding streets for two days until authorities agreed to delay demolishing the structure. Although the stalemate ended peacefully, officials continue to insist that the Arabesque features must be changed for the mosque to remain. **South China Morning Post (8/12/18) BBC (8/15/18)**

Japan

On 20 August, Japanese police arrested a 19-year-old college freshman for criminal production and possession of an illegal explosive substance. In December 2016, the student, then in high school, made approximately 57 grams of triacetone triperoxide (TATP), a powerful explosive used often by terrorist groups. He claimed to be interested in explosives and bombs and wanted to witness the power of TATP; he even made a **YouTube** video, dated March 2018, to demonstrate the explosive potential of TATP. Police also suspect that he detonated a small amount of TATP in a public park in March 2018, when police responded to complaints of a loud "thunder-like" noise and found a container of TATP. According to police, in addition to TATP, the student made erythritol tetranitrate (ETN), an even more powerful explosive. Police stated this was the first confirmed production of ETN in Japan. **The Asahi Shimbun (8/21/18) News on Japan (8/21/18)**

Japan: August IED Events



There was one IED detonation event and one IED cache event.

On 20 AUG, an IED cache was recovered in Midori Ward, Nagoya City, Aichi Prefecture in conjunction with the arrest of a 19-year old university student. The teen had been making triacetone triperoxide (TATP) and erythritol tetranitrate (ETN) explosives at his residence, where police reportedly found a cache consisting of one IED and other related chemicals. **The Asahi Shimbun (08/21/18) News on Japan (08/21/18)**

On 26 AUG, an IED detonated on the platform of a Tokyo train station, injuring one (see **Incident Highlight** for more info). **Sora News 24 (08/26/18) Japan Today (08/26/18) NHK World (08/25/18)**

The two August IED events in Japan are notable for their proximity in timing but not in location (in two different prefectures).

In Tokyo, the IED detonation at the train station may have been premature, or targeted at one person or persons, or even a capabilities test or a “statement” by a violent extremist organization like the Japan-based Aum Shinrikyo extremist cult. It is worth noting that the train station IED detonation occurred exactly one month after the 26 JUL 2018 execution of the last members of Aum Shinrikyo members who had been found guilty of carrying out the 1995 Tokyo subway sarin gas attacks.

In Aichi Prefecture, the arrested teen seems to have been attempting to make and demonstrate TATP and ETN explosives for at nearly two years. A Japanese newspaper (Sankei Shimbun) reported that the teen had shared videos and corresponded online with others interested in munitions and explosives. Newspapers also stated Aichi Police were investigating how the teen procured these chemicals and who his associates are. IED events remain rare in Japan, but because of the crowded urban areas in Japan, even small IED events can be dangerous to civilians and infrastructure.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	1	0	0	1	2
	Year	1	0	0	1	2
Event Count	Month	1	0	0	1	2
	Year	1	0	0	1	2

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

IED Calendar

The IED calendar was established to help our audience maintain awareness of events, such as anniversaries of major attacks, or political, religious or cultural events that often coincide (or can potentially coincide) with a spike in IED events.

	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
28 JUL - 3 AUG (IND): Martyr's Weeks 8 AUG 1988 (BUR): 8888 Uprising 14 AUG 1947 (IND): Naga Independence Day 15 AUG 1949 (IND): Independence Day 23 AUG 2003 (IND): Mumbai Attack - Gateway of India 31 AUG 1957 (MAL/THA): Hari Merdeka Malaysian Independence Day/Bersatu Foundation Day (Southern Thailand)	29 IND	30 IND	31 IND	1 IND	2 IND	3 IND	4
	5	6	7	8 BUR	9	10	11
	12	13	14 IND	15 IND	16	17	18
	19	20	21	22	23 IND	24	25
	26	27	28	29	30	31 MAL THA	1 BUR
1 SEP 2007 (BUR): Anniversary of Saffron Revolution 9 SEP 2004 (INDO): Anniversary of Australian Embassy Bombing 11 SEP-9 OCT (WW): Al-Hijrah Islamic New Year 25 SEP 2002 (IND): Akshardham Temple Attack 1 OCT 2005 (INDO): Bali attack anniversary 24 OCT 2002 (THA): Tak Bai Incident	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	9 INDO	10	11 WW	12 WW	13 WW	14 WW	15 WW
	16 WW	17 WW	18 WW	19 WW	20 WW	21 WW	22 WW
	23 WW	24 WW	25 IND WW	26 WW	27 WW	28 WW	29 WW
October 2018	30 WW	1 WW INDO	2 WW	3 WW	4 WW	5 WW	6 WW
	7 WW	8 WW	9 WW	10	11	12	13
	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
	21	22	23	24 THA	25	26	27
	28	29	30	31	1	2	3

IND – India
 INDO – Indonesia
 MAL – Malaysia
 THA – Thailand
 BUR – Burma
 WW – Worldwide

Common Terms and Acronyms

AN – Ammonium Nitrate	PCB – Printed Circuit Board
ANFO – Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil	PN – Partner Nation
ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	PPIED – Pressure Plate IED
CIV – Civilian	QRF – Quick Response Force
CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear	RCIED – Radio Controlled IED
COIN – Counter-insurgency	RCP – Route Clearance Patrols
CWIED – Command Wire IED	RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade
DTMF – Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency	SA – South Asia
EFP – Explosively Formed Projectile	SAF – Small Arms Fire
EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal	SEA – Southeast Asia
F/C – Found & Cleared	SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne IED
HME – Homemade Explosives	TATP – Triacetone Triperoxide
HN – Host Nation (Police, Military, Government)	TNT – Trinitrotoluene (C ₇ H ₅ N ₃ O ₆)
IDF – Indirect Fire	TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
IDP – Internally Displaced Persons	UXO – Unexploded Ordnance
IED – Improvised Explosive Device	VBIED – Vehicle Borne IED
KFR – Kidnap for Ransom	VEO – Violent Extremist Organization
KIA – Killed in Action	VOIED – Victim Operated IED
LOC – Line of Communication	WIA – Wounded in Action
LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas	
MSR – Main Supply Routes	
NFI – No Further Information	
NSTR – Nothing Significant To Report	
PBA – Post Blast Analysis	
PBIED – Personnel Borne (Suicide Bomb) IED	

Governments, Groups and Organizations

ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group	JMB – Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh
BIFF – Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters	JMJB – Jama'atul Muslim Janta Bangladesh
BIPP – Barisan Islam Perberbasan Patani	KIA – Kachin Independence Army
BRN-C – Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate	KIM – Khalifa Islamiya Mindanao
BSF – Border Security Forces	KIO – Kachin Independence Organization
BNP – Bangladesh National Party	LeT – Lashkar-e Tayyiba
BriMob – Mobile Brigade (Indonesia CT Forces)	MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front
CPI-M – Communist Party of India (Maoist)	MILF-SOG – MILF-Special Operations Group
CPN-M – Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)	MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front
CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines	NPA – New People's Army
CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force (India)	PNP – Philippine National Police
GMIP – Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani	POLRI – Indonesian National Police
HM – Hizb-ul-Mujahideen	PULO – Patani United Liberation Organization
HNLC – Hynniewtre National Liberation Council (India)	RAB – Rapid Action Battalion (Bangladesh)
HUJI-B – Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh	RKK – Runda Kumpulan Kecil
IB – India's Intelligence Bureau	SJMM – Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha
IM – Indian Mujahideen	SJTMM – Samyukta Jana Tantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
IrW – Irregular Warfare	ULFA – United Liberation Front of Assam
ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)	UWSA – United Wa State Army
ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq ash Sham	YCL – Youth Communist League
JAT – Jemaah Ansharout Tauhid	
JI – Jemaah Islamiya	
JTMM – Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha	
JIB – Jemaat-e-Islami Bangladesh	
JeM – Jaish-e-Mohammed	